BOOK REVIEWS
THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS, A DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS,

1964-1972. By Professor W.W. Kulski.* Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1972. Pp. 526. $17.50.
This book is an extremely useful analytical syllabus of contemporary Soviet
policy dealing with subjects as varied and important as conditions within the
communist world, Soviet relations with "imperialist" states, with China and
the poorer countries, disarmament, national revolutions and coexistence. Professor Kulski in short seeks to interpret Soviet participation in current world
affairs on the basis of responsible official statements and informed writings by
presumably authorized spokesmen, publicists and academicians. In translations which are uniformly excellent, he provides a wealth of reference material
which constitutes a major research accomplishment.
While it is the author himself who has made the selection, he seems to have
done this on good grounds. The only reservation which might be entered is that
at the time when some events occur it is not always possible, as I can personally
testify, to discriminate immediately between significant, and misleading, indicators. One cannot however quarrel with the historical conclusions Professor
Kulski draws, even in retrospect.His success confirms the absolute necessity
of a close perusal of the Soviet press.
The book has two dominant themes. The first is, that in pursuing its own
interests, as a priority matter, by pragmatic and deliberate design, the USSR
judges every State by the way in which that State's actions affect the USSR.
Secondarily in the matter of ideology, the Soviet commandment to other communists is, "thou shalt have no other communism but ours;" what is good for
the USSR is good for the communist movement.
The present regime has had considerably more success in the arena of world
politics, confounding the assessment of some other experts who have written it
off as a clique of mediocre dunderheads. Its greater miseries have occurred in
its attempts to hold on to ideological leadership. Professor Kulski devotes
major attention to this problem.
The author infers that a high-handed but simplistic approach has come about
through the torturous evolution of Soviet communism and its departure from
Lenin's precepts which had acquired international standing. The changes, peculiarly Russian and wrought under the stress of political rivalries, have become
so involuted and contradictary as to be incomprehensible even to the party,
much less to the populace. Accordingly, for want of a better definition, whatever body of doctrine is currently declared valid is treated as "scientific communism." The ensuing dogma has become the special property of the Soviet

*James B. Duke Professor of Russian Affairs, Duke University. LL.M. Warsaw Law School,
1925. LL.D. Paris Law School, 1927.
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leaders who interpret it and minister it to the uninitiated, who in turn are judged
to be unable to understand the intricacies of ideology.
Such exclusivity leads to some unexpected attitudes toward the emerging
Third World. Many of the new countries are thought to be too backward for
socialist revolution, certainly of the "democratic centralist type," which is the
criterion against which the Soviets measure other communist movements.
While the day of communist takeover may have to be adjourned in the neophyte nations, the USSR in the meantime develops ties of sympathy and
interest with the new "anti-imperialist" leaders, even with military regimes,
who especially commend themselves by advocating nationalization of foreign
property.
In the upside-down logic of communist definition, "rightist opportunism" is
charged against the leaders of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia who sought, in
what we would call a spirit of liberalism, to promote friendly relations between
socialist States, as well as with the outside world, at the expense of proletarian
authoritarianism. The same suspicions are held against the Italians and French
communist parties.
Professor Kulski confirms that "leftist opportunists" are even more troublesome for the USSR. They are the ones who call for radical egalitarianism and
permanent revolution. Implicitly they reproach the Soviet Union with a social
hardening of the arteries and with economic reaction. An authoritative Soviet
writer replies: "The leftist interpretation of communism as an 'equality in
misery' has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninism. People make revolution not in order to have a worse life afterwards but in order to have it improved." Professor Kulski remarks that one could not see more clearly that
the prosperity of the Soviet population is more important than all revolution
abroad.
The most serious challenge to Soviet primacy comes from China. Soviet
scholars reach back in history to identify the cause in basic differences in
cultural and social conditions. There were of course latent frictions before 1956,
which is taken as the year of the break between the Soviet and Chinese parties
brought about by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. The Chinese were
caught by surprise and were forced to explain to themselves why they had
overlooked Stalin's errors and had previously honored him. The attack on
Stalin came at a time when Mao was building up his own cult. The Chinese
rejected the Soviet 20th Congress as a revisionist conclave and on the grounds
that decisions adopted by the Congress of a single party cannot establish a
general line for the international communist movement.
Professor Kulski observes that what particularly irritates the CPSU is clever
Chinese manipulation of the contrast between developed and undeveloped
countries. Ridicule is heaped on Mao's exaltation of the "world village" over
the "world city" as the true inspiration of revolution. The September 1965
Indonesian revolt and other "left opportunist attempts" are cited as examples
of failure. Soviet critics go so far as to question whether China is a socialist
State. The dominant impression is that the process of building socialism was
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interrupted but that China might return to socialism after the elimination of
the Maoist cult.
In relating Soviet communist theory to recent history, Professor Kulski
points out that while the regime deals pragmatically with foreign policy, it will
admit no compromise regarding the ideological foundations of Soviet culture
as laid down by the party dogmatists. That is why "bridge-building" was
rejected and why convergence is viewed as a plot to subvert the socialist system.
Professor Kulski points out that in building his bridges with Eastern Europe
by first coming to an understanding with Moscow, Willy Brandt avoided the
mistakes of President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger.
The book's time frame is essentially the period of tenure of the present leadership, and the bulk of commentary is correspondingly limited. Attention is
concentrated on contemporary events, somewhat at the expense of an understanding of the long and tortured history of some basic problems. This is
noticeable in the case of disarmament and particularly with respect to Germany
where Willy Brandt's accession to influence and power is highlighted as the
main cause of Soviet rapprochement with the Federal Republic. There were of
course other reasons, including wishes for European detente as reinsurance
against China.
In dealing with the Far East, China, in Professor Kulski's opinion, came out
ahead of the USSR in Vietnam where China had an interest in a protracted
war as long as both super-powers were involved in it and as long as a chance
of direct confrontation between them could be prolonged. With respect to
Japan, we are reminded ironically that the USSR withheld signature from the
peace treaty because China was not invited to the conference and could not
sign.
Measured by evidence of sustained attention, the U.S., in Professor Kulski's
view, is the number one Soviet preoccupation, with the converse being true for
us also. He is inclined to dismiss as of secondary importance "the outburst of
anti-American recriminations in the daily Soviet press." He claims that the
more restrained statements of Soviet official spokesmen and scholars more
nearly approximate the "actual conditions of relations." Professor Kulski endorses the remark of a prominent Soviet commentator that "there is a tendency
to prevent excessive aggravation in (American) relations with the USSR." He
also cites a Gromyko statement of June 27, 1968 that "knowledge of the reality
of the nuclear age is a permanent factor which helps in preserving peace and
improving Soviet-American relations."
Admittedly it is Professor Kulski's legitimate purpose to exploit material
foreshadowing the improvement that has actually occurred. Unless the reader
keeps post-war history in mind, he may be in danger, however, of underestimating the deep antagonisms and rivalries of long standing that still separate us
from the Soviets.
The Moscow 1972 Summit fully met Professor Kulski's expectations. His
book closes in July 1972 with a brief review of Summit decisions and with some
questions about a polycentric future chiefly involving the U.S., USSR, China
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and Japan. The points of reference and sound political insight he offers in his
present work should continue to provide timely guidance.
JACOB

D.

BEAM*

By Wilbur L. Fugate. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2ded. 1973. Pp xxv, 491. $35.00.
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS.

Wilbur Fugate's treatment of the antitrust laws and foreign commerce will
certainly be (as the first edition has been) part of the armory of the lawyer
whose practice embraces antitrust aspects of foreign trade. That there has been
and will be considerable activity in this field is well illustrated by his long list
of foreign trade cases brought by the Department of Justice in Appendix B,
some 250 cases brought between 1906 and 1973 covering a variety of services
and products from aluminum to zinc.
The book is compendious but it has a focus that its readers will immediately
be aware of. It is not the purpose of this book to engage in overall assessment
of the need for U.S. regulation of foreign trade or even, except incidentally, to
measure the impact of the antitrust laws upon U.S. foreign trade. The economics and the politics are left to other studies and this book will be of primary
interest to the American and foreign practitioner. Thus, the general nature of
the antitrust laws is discussed, with a description of their domestic application,
and there are chapters on jurisdiction, general practices in the foreign area,
monopoly in foreign trade, the Webb-Pomerene Act, patents, trademarks,
mergers and joint ventures, regulated industries and special problems of relief.
Chapter 15 attempts an overall evaluation and reviews progress toward intergovernmental cooperation in enforcement and comity. The last chapter discusses foreign antitrust laws.
The book may thus be described as an in depth survey of its subject, a good
place for either the student or the practioner to begin to grapple with the
problems of foreign commerce and the antitrust laws. To say only that, however, might be to say too little because Foreign Trade and the Antitrust Laws
is broad enough in scope and rich enough in detail to acquaint the searcher with
all of the literature that relates to his problem. It is not, however, a how-todo-it book but a comprehensive treatment of the substantive and some of the
procedural law in this field. Prospective users of the work will be reassured to
know that this second edition is truly a revision of the original book, with
almost 300 pages of valuable material added.
Any reviewer of a book ought to avoid the initial trap that invites him to
criticize the author for not having written the book the reviewer would have
*United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1969-73). B.A. Princeton, 1929: Cambridge
University (1929-30): service with the State Department since 1931, including: ambassador to
Poland (1957-61), U.S. representative at the Warsaw talks with representatives of the People's
Republic of China (1958-61), and ambassador to Czechoslovakia (1966-69).

